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ABSTRACT
Dellingr, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center’s (GSFC) first 6U CubeSat, was deployed from the International Space
Station (ISS) on November 20, 2017. The primary objective of the mission was to apply and appropriately tailor GSFC
knowledge and capability to design and build a CubeSat that increased resiliency and capability, while containing
costs. The Dellingr spacecraft is a mixture of COTS and in-house components and includes two science instruments
– an advanced gated time-of-flight ion-neutral mass spectrometer (INMS) and a boom mounted fluxgate. While a
traditional GSFC spacecraft approach includes detailed analysis, design, testing, and extensive reviews, the Dellingr
team adopted a “build, test, fix” approach to identify and correct potential mission ending issues. Yet, despite extensive
testing, Dellingr immediately experienced unexpected major anomalies once on orbit. Using a flatsat and the insight
gained from extensive on-orbit engineering data, the team was able to alleviate some of these anomalies and recover
some of the lost functionality. The extensive set of lessons-learned is driving changes to our systems architecture,
flight software, and testing approaches, and has provided valuable insight into what is required to produce a NASA
CubeSat science mission with a moderate assurance of mission success, while containing resource requirements.
INTRODUCTION

post-launch mission objective. Dellingr was designed to
keep the INMS entrance aperture, located on the +Y 2U
face, in the ram-pointed direction – i.e. pointed in the
direction of spacecraft motion – so that ionospheric
particles could enter the aperture to be measured. This
orientation required an active attitude-control
subsystems with several key components in order to
achieve the desired control. The instrument required
several weeks of outgassing before we could turn on the
high-voltage, a delay that impacted our ability to turn on
the instrument given spacecraft anomalies that appeared
soon after launch.

Dellingr is a 6U CubeSat developed internally at
NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). The
objective was to leverage commercial CubeSat
development and apply and appropriately tailor GSFC
knowledge and capability to design and build a CubeSat
that increased resiliency and capability, while
minimizing mission lifecycle costs. The spacecraft,
described in a previous paper1, is a mixture of
commercial off the shelf (COTS) and in-house
subsystems. This paper focuses on issues that have arisen
while on-orbit, our approach to identifying and solving
or working around these issues, and lessons learned from
those experiences.

A primary feature of the Failure Detection and
Correction (FDC) scheme for Dellingr consisted of a 25hour reset that power cycled the spacecraft. The
spacecraft is reset as part of daily operations, so that it
does not interfere with planned activities. There is also a
25-hour reset that will power-cycle the spacecraft if the
daily reset fails to reset the spacecraft or the spacecraft
exits the daily operations cycle. The 25-hour counter
restarts every time the spacecraft reboots. This power
cycle was intended to automatically clear any potential
issues and single event upsets, while also reducing the
FDC development effort. While the 25-hour reset
rescued the satellite on more than 1 occasion, it
sometimes made troubleshooting and scheduling more
difficult in other situations.

On-orbit events, anomalies, and the team’s responses are
presented in sequential order, as they occurred during the
mission, rather than organized by subsystem. We feel
this provides insight into how our team approached
determining the source of abnormal behavior and
recovered from potentially mission-ending anomalies.
OVERVIEW
Dellingr was primarily an engineering demonstration
mission, but also contained two science instruments: a
boom-mounted fluxgate magnetometer, and a novel
gated time-of-flight ion-neutral mass spectrometer
(INMS)1. The INMS is a key instrument for future
ionospheric Heliophysics missions and validating the
instrument and characterizing its performance was a key
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An important aspect of lessons learned from Dellingr
operations is the difference between making a spacecraft
mission reliable versus making it resilient. From the
standpoint of achieving mission success with an
appropriate and tolerable level of risk and resource
expenditure, it is potentially more cost-effective to focus
on resiliency rather than exclusively on reliability. We
discuss this further at the end of the paper.

deployers were swapped with an empty slot and the
release commands were not being received by the
Dellingr deployer. The ISS operations team proceeded to
command the correct connector after exiting eclipse,
with a successful deployment just after noon EST.
Even with the low resolution live feed it was quickly
apparent that Dellingr had experienced the first anomaly
of on-orbit operations, just seconds into the mission: The
magnetometer boom and UHF antenna deployed
immediately upon ejection, despite a 30-minute built-in
delay timer. Figure 1 shows a high-resolution image of
Dellingr deployment. The magnetometer boom is seen
clearly pointed to the lower part of the picture, as are the
UHF antenna.

Table 1 provides a summary of significant spacecraft
events that occurred after Dellingr made it to space. In
the sections that follow we step through these events.
Date
Pre-deployment

Event
Spacecraft turned on inside the
NanoRacks deployer

20-Nov-2017

Deployment from ISS

20-Nov-2017

Contact on first pass

30-Nov-2017

Anomalous gyro and sun pointing
accuracy

19-Dec-2017

GPS unresponsive

21-Dec-2017

Determined FSS unusually noisy

25-Jan-2018

Spacecraft data deleted – unknown
cause

26-Jan – 6-Feb 2018

Unable to talk to flight computer.
continuous reset state

6-Feb-2018

Recovery

6-Feb-2018

INMS turned on; ion data collected

14-Feb – 21-Feb-2018

Startup RTS001 V1 uploaded

22-Feb-2018

INMS filament burn in

28-Feb-2018

Startup RTS001 V2 uploaded

26-Mar-2018

Spacecraft data deleted – unknown
cause

29-Mar – 5-Apr-2018

B-dot V1 upload

12-Apr – 17-Apr-2018

B-dot V2 upload

1-May – 7-May-2018

B-dot V3 upload (attempt 1)

8-May – 15-May-2018

B-dot V3 upload

1-Jun-2018 - present

Figure 1. Photographs of Dellingr’s deployment
confirmed that both the magnetometer boom and
the antenna deployed immediately upon ejection
from the NanoRacks deployer.
The first downlink pass was at 8:00 PM (EST) at the
NASA Wallops Flight Facility (WFF) UHF ground
station. The satellite responded on the first contact
attempt. Telemetry showed that the satellite had
automatically entered sun-pointing mode, with the 6U
face pointed towards the sun, and was maintaining a
healthy power profile.

INMS neutral commissioning

Table 1. Dellingr on-orbit event list
DEPLOYMENT AND INITIAL CHECKOUT

Analysis of the onboard data collected prior to
deployment is consistent with the satellite having turned
on while still inside the ISS. Figure 2 shows the battery
voltage and temperature for the first hours of Dellingr’s
mission and includes pre- and post-deployment data. The
system clock booted into a default epoch, as it was
intended to sync with GPS once deployed, so the initial
time of the pre-deployment data is unknown. But we can
infer the most likely scenario for when this initial
deployment occurred.

Dellingr was launched to the International Space Station
on August 14, 2017, via the SpaceX Falcon-9 launch of
CRS-12. Ejection from the NanoRacks 6U deployer was
scheduled for the morning (EST) of November 20, 2017.
The Dellingr team watched a live feed of deployment,
but as the countdown reached zero on the first attempt
there was no indication of ejection. The NanoRacks team
reset the deployer and made a few more attempts to eject
Dellingr, all of which failed. The ISS then entered
eclipse, and the NanoRacks team, in conjunction with
ISS personnel, discovered that connectors on the
Kepko
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system. The battery voltage depleted slowly over the
course of 17 hours until the safety circuits, triggered off
the low voltage, shut down the power system. At this
point, the satellite was still inside the deployer with
uncharged batteries. The satellite turned on again after
deployment from the ISS (approximately hour 24 in
Figure 2), once the batteries had recharged sufficiently
via power from the solar panels. The time between the
EPS shutoff due to low battery voltage and the turn-on
once batteries were recharged is unknown, since the
internal clock was reset. The 7-hour gap in Figure 2 is
for illustration purposes only.

redundancy. The most likely timeframe is between
removal of the deployer preload aboard ISS and robot
arm operations. Our leading theory suggests that the
clustering of the sensors on a small surface area of the
spacecraft combined with the NanoRacks deployer
geometry lead to an inadvertent release of the switches.
Figure 3 shows the location of the three Dellingr
separation switches, which are concentrated in a corner
of the 2U face (bottom left). This side of the satellite
rested against the deployer door. From delivery to predeployment, a static preload was applied to keep the
satellite from moving during launch and handling.
During ISS operations, the preload was removed by an
astronaut, thereby removing pressure at the door, and
causing the door to move 0.025”. In principle, the pusher
plate should have had enough force to depress the
switches against the door and maintain the inhibit. It is
believed that interactions between pusher plate,
clearances on the rails, ganged switches, door
movement, and friction caused a distribution of pusher
plate force that was not sufficient to keep switches
pressed down in the off position. We confirmed that the
satellite waited 30 minutes after disengagement of the
switches to deploy the boom and antenna (Figure 2).
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Figure 2. On-orbit battery voltage (top) and
temperature (bottom) telemetry indicates that
Dellingr had turned on inside the deployer while
onboard the ISS. After deployment the spacecraft
tumbled until the batteries recharged sufficiently to
turn the spacecraft back on, at which point it
acquired the sun, and entered stable sun-point
mode.

Figure 3. Dellingr’s separation switches were located
at the bottom left corner of a 2U face and depressed
by pressure against the NanoRacks deployer door.

The subsequent telemetry shows that the satellite
recharged and maintained a healthy battery voltage while
sun pointing, depleting the batteries slightly during
periods of eclipse, as expected. The 17-hour profile of
pre-deployment temperature shows that Dellingr was in
a stable, controlled temperature environment of 23.6°C
(74.5°F), very close to the 23.9°C (75°C) temperature of
the ISS. It is therefore unlikely that deployment occurred
while the satellite was in the NanoRacks deployer while
attached to the ISS robot arm, since some type of
temperature cycling should have been observed. We also
eliminate ground handling, launch, and ISS storage prior
to pre-deployment activities, since we cannot develop a
viable theory that would cause a 17-hour disengagement
of the safety inhibits while the deployer is under axial
preload. In addition, a mechanical failure of the
separation switch is unlikely due to its triple independent
Kepko

Inadvertent power on of the spacecraft while onboard the
ISS did not pose a risk to the spacecraft or the ISS, due
to the system design and testing performed before
launch. The team tested what would happen if the boom
and antenna release mechanisms failed (or were
unexpectedly deployed) while inside the canisterized
dispenser. This test showed no hang-ups and smooth
ejection, as we were able to verify in real-time watching
the video feed. By design, all Dellingr transmissions are
initiated by the ground, and the satellite did not include
a beacon. In retrospect, if Dellingr had included an
automatic beacon it would have radiated while inside the
deployer, with potential unforeseen consequences.
Power system and battery protection circuits monitored
the battery levels and kept them from entering a
dangerously low voltage level. Although unexpected, the
3
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system design and on-ground testing mitigated a
potentially mission-ending anomaly.

Another anomaly observed, shown in the bottom of
Figure 4, is the occasional increase of reaction wheel
speed to maximum values during eclipse. The speeding
up of the wheels, which was later attributed to a software
bug, by itself was not a major concern, as the small
CubeSat wheels could not destabilize the spacecraft, and
after exiting eclipse the spacecraft appeared to reacquire
sun-point mode fairly quickly. Since it was not related to
the pointing accuracy issue observed during sun
pointing, and as it did not seem to adversely affect the
system, we deferred further investigation of the wheel
speed-up issue.

Once deployed (into space), the recorded telemetry (after
hour 24 in Figure 2) confirmed that once the satellite’s
batteries had recharged, the satellite automatically
entered sun-point mode, as designed, with the 6U face
pointed toward the sun and reaction wheels providing 3axis control. Figure 2 shows that the satellite recovered
nicely from the low voltage state, and fully charged the
batteries after several orbits.
Evaluation of the satellite state and the deployment
anomaly was the focus of the first 2 days of operations.
With the power-positive state of the spacecraft the team
went into the Thanksgiving holiday break, and
successfully contacted the spacecraft 5 days later to
begin spacecraft checkout in earnest.
SUN POINTING PERFORMANCE
Dellingr uses a combination of 6 coarse sun sensors (1
on each face) and 2 fine sun sensors (FSS) on the +Y 6U
face to obtain knowledge of spacecraft orientation, 3
reaction wheels to point the spacecraft, and
magnetotorquers embedded in each solar panel to control
momentum. Initial checkout of the ACS system
indicated several issues of concern.
When in sun-point mode, the FSS provides the angles of
the spacecraft coordinate system with respect to the sun,
with 1 towards the sun, 0 perpendicular, and -1 anti-sun.
While performing checkout of the attitude control
performance, the team noticed the sun vector was very
noisy, particularly in the x component. The satellite +Y
(6U) face should be pointed to the sun during sun
pointing mode. The high frequency, large amplitude,
noise observed in Figure 4 would indicate the spacecraft
was rapidly moving its orientation with respect to the
sun, but the reaction wheels were incapable of moving
the spacecraft that quickly over such a large angle. We
concluded that the spacecraft attitude was not moving as
rapidly as indicated by the sun vector solution, but that
the data from the FSS was noisy, for unknown reasons.

Figure 4. The ACS system exhibited noisy sun vector
solutions (top panel), particularly in the x
component, which resulted in heavy commanding of
the reaction wheels (middle panel). Reaction wheel
speed also exhibited unexpected behavior during
eclipse. (bottom panel), sometimes accelerating to
maximum value.
Dellingr carried two fine sun sensors. The first was an
in-house developed FSS (WFSS) that had been
demonstrated through ground testing to have a high level
of accuracy. The second was a GomSpace fine sun
sensor (GFSS), as backup, with a lower performance
accuracy but with flight heritage. The default was to use
the WFSS, and the satellite included a failure detection
and correction action that would automatically switch to
GomSpace sensor data if no or stale data from the inhouse sensor was obtained.

The effects of this noisy sun sensor data were twofold.
First, the reaction wheel torque commands (Figure 4
middle panel) shows that the spacecraft was heavily
torqueing the wheels to respond to what it believed to be
pointing errors, often to maximum torques and with
rapid switches in direction. Second, the sensor noise
made it impossible for the Kalman filter to converge on
a good attitude solution to achieve eventual ram pointing
for mass spectrometer science. Since this impacted
INMS science operations, this issue halted the
progression of the commissioning phase until the team
could determine the source of the noise.
Kepko

Nominal spacecraft telemetry includes sun vector from
the fine sun sensors but it does not indicate which sun
4

32nd Annual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

sensor was used, in an effort to reduce spacecraft bus
telemetry size. The team commanded the spacecraft to
retain individual sun sensor data to investigate sun sensor
performance. Figure 5 shows simultaneously collected
Y-axis (6U face, nominally pointed towards the sun) data
from the in-house and GomSpace sun sensors. The figure
shows the WFSS produced noisy and erroneous sun
vector data, while the GomSpace accurately reported
stable sun-pointing. Stable pointing was also confirmed
by the energy entering the system from the solar panels.
Erratic sun pointing such as the one reported by the inhouse sun sensor would show non-constant power
harvesting, but this was not observed. Despite a noisy
FSS, stable sun-pointing was achieved since the control
algorithm was designed such that random noise errors
canceled. The resulting torque commands on the reaction
wheels were a major concern, however, because they
were driving the reaction wheels very hard and changing
direction.

to using the noisy WFSS. A permanent fix required a
software change to prioritize the GomSpace sun sensor
over the in-house sun sensor. While working on such
patch other, higher priority, issues appeared and
temporarily halted the sun sensor patch work.
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Figure 6. Dellingr carried two fine sun sensors.
From ~0.5-3.5 hours, the GomSpace FSS was active
and indicates accurate sun pointing with Y-axis
measuring 1 (pointed to sun), X and Z near 0
(perpendicular to sun) when sunlit. At hour ~3.5, we
switched to the WFF FSS, and saw an immediate
increase in the noise level. WFSS sun sensor data
were the default for the first few months of the
mission
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Dellingr carries a Sensonor STIM210 Inertial
Measurement Unit (IMU) to provide body rotation rates.
However, it has not been providing accurate data since
deployment. Recreating and debugging the issue has
been complicated by the accommodations made to
integrate the IMU into the spacecraft. The interface to
the IMU is serial, but all serial interfaces to the flight
computer were already allocated. We added an I2C to
Serial converter, which required a TTL-RS422
converter. This added two additional points of failure for
the IMU. It also added another device to the I2C bus,
which already had several devices on it, including the
reaction wheels. The I2C bus is not ideal, since a failure
in one I2C bus component risks taking down the entire
bus and thus all other devices on it, unless I2C isolators
are utilized.

Figure 5. Dellingr was commanded to send data
from both sun sensors in an attempt to pinpoint the
source of noisy sun vector data. Sun-pointing is
indicated by a value of 1.
Diagnosing and solving the problem without a second
sun sensor would have been difficult. The information
in-hand indicated noisy in-house sun sensor data and the
failure detection and correction on-board did not switch
to the secondary sun sensor because noisy data was not
considered a credible failure mode. The team switched
off the in-house WFSS, to verify that the FDC would
switch automatically to the backup GFSS. As expected,
FDC performed as designed, and the sun vector data
became very clean once the in-house WFSS was
switched off, then noisy again immediately when the inhouse WFSS was turned back on (Figure 6). Figure 6
also shows the reaction wheel torque, demonstrating a
more stable control while utilizing the GomSpace sun
sensor.

The IMU itself was designed to be used at a high data
rates (up to 2000 Hz), which is significantly faster than
our ACS cadence of 1 Hz. Reading the IMU at 1 Hz
using the IMU’s external trigger mode proved to be too
noisy, so the flight software was modified to read the
IMU at 10 Hz and provide ACS with a sliding average.
This further burdened the flight computer and the I2C

While we could manually turn off the noisy WFSS, the
FDC 25-hour daily reset would automatically revert back
Kepko
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bus. The fact that the IMU is used for attitude
determination and control complicates the testing of the
device. We are using the “42” simulator that allows us to
simulate attitude and trajectory dynamics for testing of
the flight ACS software on the flight computer but
simulate the IMU for these tests.

having a spare IMU and a reasonable approximation of
the other hardware on board, we have not been able to
recreate the issue using the flatsat.
If we are not able to recreate the issue on the ground, we
have the option to upload new applications to the
spacecraft. For information gathering purposes it would
be preferable to already have some diagnostic
functionality built in, rather than rely on a software patch
upload. For example, being able to send commands from
the ground and receive data back from the IMU would
be beneficial. Unfortunately, most of our byte-level
interactions with the hardware are contained in a
hardware library that is not accessible by our software
applications.

These accommodations have complicated debugging the
IMU issue, as we have no access to the operation of the
converters in flight. Some raw data from the IMU is
stored in telemetry, beyond just the sliding average, in
the form of housekeeping data, but only a fraction of the
raw messages from the IMU are stored to save downlink
and radio resources. Unfortunately, the Cyclic
Redundancy Check (CRC) values from the IMU are not
stored; only a flag that notes if the CRC check passed. It
would be preferable to have the CRC with the rest of the

The fact that the IMU shares the I2C bus with other
devices introduces more uncertainties. The reaction
wheels have experienced issues on the I2C bus during
flight, which may cause the IMU problem, be a symptom
of it, or due to interactions with another device on the
bus. Unfortunately, the original flight software did not
provide a flexible interface to isolate the power on the
devices, as power state was tied to the spacecraft's mode
of operation. This was altered later in the mission.
LOSS OF GPS
Dellingr carried a Novatel GPS (OEMV-1G) that failed
on December 16, 2017, less than 1 month into the
mission. The GPS telemetry shown in Figure 8 appears
to show the moment the GPS failed. For the first 2 hours
of the interval, the GPS reliably calculated the location
of the spacecraft (top panel). During this time, it
alternated between pulling ~327 mA and 440 mA; the
majority of the telemetry was at 327 mA. Near 2:15, The
telemetry showed a sudden change in the current draw,
down to 280 mA, and a slight drop in temperature,
suggesting a component failure on the GPS card. The
next set of telemetry, just before hour 5, showed no
current draw and zeros for the GPS-derived location.

Figure 7. Dellingr flatsat
raw data to confirm on the ground that the data from the
IMU is not being corrupted by the converters.
Our investigation into the issue has thus far been
inconclusive. The data as read on the flight computer
appears to be valid from the IMU, as the CRC check is
passing. However, the data itself appears incorrect. The
data repeats the same values over hundreds of
consecutive readings, a behavior that we did not observe
during testing.

The loss of the GPS was a major blow to the mission, as
it eliminated the real-time ephemeris that was necessary
for flying the spacecraft in a 3-axis, ram-pointed
orientation. The best orientation for INMS science
would have been to establish a fixed attitude relative to
the local-vertical, local-horizontal (LVLH) frame with
the INMS entrance aperture in the ram direction, and the
Y-axis of the spacecraft (6U face) in a direction to
optimize power production over the orbit (dependent on
beta angle). Establishing an LVLH frame with no
onboard capability to directly sense the Earth or the
direction of nadir requires two computations. First, the
FSW was designed to calculate the LVLH frame relative
to inertial space using output from the GPS receiver. This
would provide a target quaternion in the inertial frame.

We have attempted to recreate the issue on the ground
through use of a flatsat (Figure 7). The flatsat has been
assembled from engineering units and spare parts. It is
based around a custom backplane for PC-104 connectors
which allows components to be added and removed with
ease. One thing we are lacking is a spare Cadet radio.
Instead, we are using a Cadet simulator program
developed by NASA's Independent Verification and
Validation (IV&V) Facility. This allows us to complete
the loop between the flight software and ground control
software to view the telemetry in real-time. Despite
Kepko

6

32nd Annual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

every 63 seconds, rendering ground communication with
the flight computer impossible.
Reset Counter

The second computation is to determine the inertial
attitude well enough to align the body with the LVLH
target. A computationally efficient extended Kalman
filter (EKF) was designed for the mission. Because the
rotational rates in an LVLH-fixed frame are very low, an
IMU with good rate resolution at low rates was needed
for the attitude propagation step of the EKF. To make
corrections to the attitude estimate, the EKF would
compare the sun sensor measurements to the expected
values from the onboard solar ephemeris, and the
magnetometer measurements would be compared with
an onboard magnetic field model. This magnetic field
model was driven by the GPS location measurements.
All four of these information sources – GPS,
magnetometer, FSS, and onboard sun ephemerid plus the
magnetic field model – were necessary for Dellingr to fly
in an LVLH-fixed attitude. The loss of GPS meant that
the spacecraft could not maintain an LVLH attitude. An
onboard ephemeris calculation was not possible because
it would have been too computationally intensive for the
flight computer.
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Figure 8. Interval when the GPS failed.
THE RESET PROBLEM
In the middle of January, the spacecraft started to show
resets outside the expected daily reset. At first, the data
showed a potentially thermal-related issue that caused
multiple system resets a few minutes after entering
eclipse, and then again a few minutes after exiting
eclipse (Figure 9). Resets are indicated by an increase in
the reset counter (top panel). The frequency of the resets
rapidly increased to the point that by January 27th the
spacecraft had entered a state of constant resets, once
Kepko
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In normal operation the flight computer sends data to the
radio for later download. Furthermore, the radio is
connected directly to the voltage busses without
switches. Since we could not communicate through the
flight computer, on January 31st the team sent commands
directly to the radio to download data, to test if the reset
was localized to the on-board computer or if the power
system was resetting the entire satellite. During these
ground passes, we were able to communicate to the radio
without interruption, thus isolating the reset issue to the
on-board computer, rather than the EPS. If the EPS had
been triggering the resets, the spacecraft would have
rebooted during the typically 5-7 minute duration of the
passes. As the system booted up we noted that the FSW
was sending limited telemetry to the radio – telemetry
that included the boot-up logs. Review of this telemetry
indicated that the flight computer crashed at the same
point of the boot cycle, 63 seconds in, when it attempted
to communicate with the I2C devices. We were able to
reproduce the crash on the ground with the flatsat and
isolated the issue to a bug in the I2C driver. The bug is in
the code that is supposed to prevent simultaneous access
to the I2C driver by different tasks in the FSW. If two or
more tasks were trying access the I2C bus at the same
time, one would gain access to the bus, and the others
would wait with a 10 second timeout. If the task that had
access was delayed due to I2C device errors, the waiting
tasks would eventually timeout and access the bus
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Figure 9. Data from January 26, 2018, showing an
example of resets and I2C errors seemingly
associated with entering and exiting eclipse. Resets
are indicated by increases by the reset counter.
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anyway, causing the crash. Correction of the device
driver was found to be a simple one-line modification.

By turning off the wheels, we had removed the resets
completely. But without wheel control the spacecraft
could no longer maintain a sun pointing orientation. Still,
we were finally able to turn on the INMS, and a few days
later, on February 9th, we had spectra (Figure 10).
Validating the INMS instrument was a key goal of the
mission, and the team rightly celebrated the recovery.

Although we had isolated the problem, we could not alter
the driver onboard the spacecraft to avoid the crash. It
was not in an area of the FSW that we could modify
through ground uploads. The EPS had a 4-minute
watchdog timer on the I2C line. If it did not see activity
for 4 minutes it would power cycle the spacecraft. But
during the 63 second reboot sequence, the flight
computer utilized the I2C line just enough so that the
watchdog never tripped.

But just a few weeks later, Dellingr again found itself in
a state that threatened to end the mission.

From January 27th-February 5th, 2018, the spacecraft
rebooted continuously, every 63 seconds, reaching over
13,000 resets over this period. During this time, the
satellite was inoperable, and it appeared to be an end-ofmission failure mode. The team had begun to plan a
check-in schedule, perhaps once/week, to see if the issue
had resolved itself.
The Cadet radio has a ground-commanded reset line that
can be used to reset the on-board computer. By itself, that
was not helpful, as the flight computer was already
resetting. However, the team theorized that if during a
ground pass we could constantly command the radio to
reset the flight computer so that it never booted far
enough into the sequence to service the I2C line, the EPS
watchdog would, after 4 minutes of silence, power cycle
the spacecraft. It was a longshot to be sure.

Figure 10. The first ion spectra from Dellingr.
THE SPIN PROBLEM
The revised operations plan was to keep the wheels and
ACS system off during most of the week, and let the
spacecraft slowly spin about the sun-pointing axis while
INMS was turned on. At various times in the orbit the
2U face would spin through the ram, and the INMS
instrument would collect data. It appeared that the
reaction wheels could remain operational for a little more
than 24 hours without inducing the recurrent 63-second
reset loop. Therefore, at the beginning of the week we
would turn on the reaction wheels and ACS system to
ensure the spacecraft remained nominally pointed at the
sun, and to unload any accumulated momentum.

On February 6th during a pass at WFF, the team
attempted this “back-door” reset but had to wait until the
next pass to see the results. After the second pass,
approximately 90 minutes later, the team received an
email from the ground operator:
“We just confirm Dellingr back to business”
It worked. By constantly commanding the radio to reset
the flight computer we had effectively jammed it and
triggered an EPS watchdog reset. During the interval of
constant resets, the team had theorized that the issue was
high traffic on the I2C line. The current theory revolves
around degraded components on the I2C line, making the
line unstable. After recovering the spacecraft, the team
immediately disabled the reaction wheels to decrease I2C
traffic, as the reaction wheels are by far the worst
offender on I2C traffic, with each of the 3 wheels
communicating on the bus at 10 Hz.

Yet it soon became clear that the ACS system was not
keeping the 6U face pointed towards the sun and, in fact,
the ACS system seemed to be having no effect on the
attitude at all. On March 6th, 2018, by fitting a sinusoid
to the science magnetometer data, we saw the first
indication that Dellingr was in an uncontrolled, fastspinning tumble (Figure 11). The maximum observed
spin rate was about 105°/sec (17.5 RPM) primarily about
the body-Y axis (6U face), and all the reaction wheels
were saturated at maximum speed. The ACS system was
designed to work at spin rates below about 5.0°/sec/axis,
so Dellingr was operating well outside the design limits.
The ACS system appeared unable to unload the spin

Later that same day, the team received another email,
from our project manager:
“Victory. [We were] able to turn on INMS in the ion
mode. We had no resets between the last pass and this
one.”
Kepko
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momentum. The tumbling rate faced some initial
skepticism because it wasn’t clear to the ACS engineers
how Dellingr could have reached that high spin rate
(about 20x Dellingr momentum capacity). Also, 17.5
RPM is just under the Nyquist frequency where one can
deterministically assess rate based on the 1 Hz sampling
rate. Between that and limited and noisy data, it seemed
serendipitous for Dellingr to be in an uncontrolled yet
observable state. Nonetheless, the de-tumbling effort
soon commenced. Determining how the spacecraft
entered the uncontrolled, rapid spin rate would have to
wait.
4

The first version of the patched B-dot control software
eliminated the off-pulse cycle of the magnetorquers,
effectively increasing the actuation cycle to 1 Hz. While
1 Hz sensing and actuation is still suboptimal, this
controller
was
a
relatively
straightforward
implementation such that, even if it couldn’t completely
de-tumble Dellingr, it should restrict the spacecraft to a
lower rate. At the time, before the root cause for
tumbling was identified and before sufficient
characterization was done on the magnetic control loop,
it was deemed the appropriate action. The first B-dot
patch was uploaded to the spacecraft over the course of
a week but was deemed ineffective in affecting the rate
one way or another.

#10 4

Ts = 3.642s
3

The second version of the patched B-dot control software
took advantage of the parallel processing nature of the
cFS architecture by placing the B-dot on an
asynchronous schedule relative to other processes
thereby giving B-dot the capability to off-pulse the
magnetorquers and, more importantly, sample the
magnetometers 250 milliseconds apart, reducing the
measurement delay necessary for effective B-dot
control. On a given B-dot control cycle, B-dot first
turned off all three torquers, waited for some parameter
defined duration of time, sampled the magnetometers,
waited for 250 milliseconds (also a commandable
parameter), sampled the magnetometers a second time,
and then commanded the torquers for the rest of the
roughly 1 second actuation cycle period. The second
version of the patched B-dot software also turned out to
be ineffective. However, the additional parameterization
gave us much-improved insights to our magnetometer,
which became the key to the final, successful
implementation.
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Figure 11. Sine wave fits to the x component of the
magnetic field data from March 6th provided
accurate assessment of the spin rate, even with
unevenly sampled data.
RECOVERY FROM UNCONTROLLED SPIN
It was clear from the beginning that options to de-tumble
Dellingr were limited to magnetic sensing and control.
The onboard ACS software included a coded but
untested “B-dot” control algorithm. A B-dot algorithm is
a reliable, time-proven, simple magnetic detumbling
algorithm originally proposed in Stickler and Alfriend
(1976)2. The B-dot control law is given by

After the second failed attempt to de-tumble Dellingr,
the team experimented with several timing parameters
within the B-dot software and found that the
magnetometer measurements were sometimes nulled or
had unexplained biases. It turned out the B-dot algorithm
was competing with the original magnetometer data
acquisition and processing application; in a given 1
second period, the third magnetometer query (outside of
B-dot), depending on its relative timing with respect to
B-dot, could corrupt each other’s results (a so called
“race-condition”). While we were crosschecking the
precise timing of these various processes against our
working theory with observed flight data, the team got
another valuable insight from the magnetometer
instrument engineer about the serial nature of how
magnetometer data acquisition is handled. Up until this
point, the B-dot implementation team had an incorrect
understanding that upon a magnetometer data query, the
software will return the latest measurement after about
150 milliseconds. That turned out to be partially true.

𝑚 = −𝐾𝑏̇
where m is the induced dipole, K is a positive gain
matrix, and 𝑏̇ is the rate of change of the measured
magnetic field in the body frame (hence “B-dot”).
However, the default 1 Hz sampling rate of the
magnetometer and the 0.5 Hz magnetic-control actuation
cycle introduced a significant amount of time/phase lag
into the system, making the original onboard B-dot detumble implementation ineffective at the spin rate
Dellingr was in. The team would have to develop a new
B-dot software patch and upload it to the spacecraft.

Kepko
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The Dellingr magnetometer, upon query, immediately
returns data collected from the time of the last query and
collects data for the next query in the following 150
milliseconds.

(bottom panel) calculated via fits to the magnetic field
observations tells the story. The z axis spin rate remained
relatively constant at ~80 seconds, but the x and y axes
saw an initial decrease to ~35 seconds (i.e., sped up),
followed by a slow decrease that was due to the
magnetotorquers attempting to unload wheel
momentum. By the end of the eclipse, the spacecraft was
spinning with a 20s spin period about the z axis, then
recovered quickly once leaving eclipse.

The third and the final B-dot software patch had features
to avoid race-condition with the science data acquisition
application while also sampling the magnetometers three
times within a 1-second period. It utilized the data from
the last two queries that corresponds to time from the
first two queries collected within the 1-second period.
This final implantation is given by
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Dellingr was successfully despun over the weekend of
May 19-20, 2018.
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Figure 12. Timing diagram of the final B-dot
algorithm.
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The leading theory to explain the root cause that brought
Dellingr to the high-rate tumbling state appears to be a
magnetic control software implementation error that
occurs during eclipse. The Dellingr ACS was designed
to send zeroed torque commands to the reaction wheel
during eclipse while momentum unloading of the wheels
continued. It was discovered during in-flight operations
that the last reaction wheel command before eclipse
entry was effectively stuck in the command queue and
caused the wheel speeds to linearly increase till
saturation (see Figure 4). At the same time, the magnetic
control loop continuously attempted to unload the wheel
momentum for a prolonged period. This continuous
magnetotorquing spun up the spacecraft to a high spin
rate.

Figure 13. Example of Dellingr body rate changes
during eclipse. Spin fits of zero indicate a bad fit and
should be ignored.
The aforementioned ACS FSW implementation error
would have been uncovered during the more typical
Goddard FSW development process. However, such a
process was not in place for the low-cost Dellingr
development effort. The limited amount of system-level
(ACS end-to-end) testing did not uncover the error
because it did not include the real-life scenario where we
had a failed GPS and IMU, which together caused the
poor attitude control performance upon entering eclipse,
and a rogue magnetic control loop unchecked by an
IMU. The de-tumbling recovery process also could have
been smoother had we had a more robust implementation
of a B-dot controller. The failure to have a working
robust algorithm combined with limited people
resources and documentation made the final effort take
much longer.

Although we do not have data from the interval that spun
up the spacecraft to the uncontrollable state, we have
seen the effect throughout the mission. An example is
shown below in Figure 13. Prior to eclipse the spacecraft
was spinning about the y-axis, as indicated by the
magnetic field measurements, with the x and z
component seeing a quadrature magnetic field. Upon
entering eclipse near 0.2 hours, reaction wheel Z (2U
face) accelerated to maximum speed, and the spin
orientation of the spacecraft changed. The spin period
Kepko
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FLIGHT SOFTWARE PATCHES
During the course of on-orbit operations, several updates
have been made to the Dellingr flight software including
command sequence tables to enable more efficient
passes, a new B-dot control application to de-spin the
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spacecraft, and a new INMS instrument application to
maximize the INMS data collection given the current
state of the spacecraft hardware. The flexibility and
features provided by the Core Flight System (cFS)
enabled these updates to be made.

After the B-dot patch was able to successfully de-spin
the spacecraft, the team focused on improving the data
collection from the INMS instrument. The INMS
instrument is also controlled by an uploadable cFS
application, so a new update was designed to improve
the ability to collect data from the instrument given the
state of Dellingr. The INMS update consisted of two
changes, one minor change to allow INMS data
collection in any spacecraft mode, and one major
addition to enhance our ability to operate the spacecraft.
The major addition included a new feature called the
“Command Sequence Engine” (CSE) that allows a
sequence of 16-bit sequence commands to be packed into
a single ground command to the spacecraft. The
sequence commands include: select telemetry filter
table, start RTS, turn on Power Supply Electronics (PSE)
switch, turn off PSE switch, enable INMS data
collection, disable INMS data collection, delay, enable
B-DOT mode, and reset the spacecraft. With the addition
of the CSE, the operators can send a single command to
operate the spacecraft for up to a day, primarily
collecting data from the INMS instrument.

Dellingr uses NASA/GSFC’s core Flight System flight
software which is being used on class B missions such as
the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO), the
Magnetospheric Multiscale (MMS) mission and the
Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) mission. The
cFS provides the maintenance features that enabled the
changes that have been made on Dellingr. The cFS
features that enabled the maintenance included the
ability to:
●
●
●
●
●

Upload files to the on-board file system;
Verify the size and CRC of a file on the file
system;
Manage on-board files;
Individually replace cFS applications;
Compress cFS applications to reduce uplink
bandwidth;

Future flight software updates will include modifications
to the Reaction Wheel (RW) cFS application, and
potentially updates to the ACS cFS application to
account for hardware failures.

The first software changes involved updating the onboard command sequence tables known as Relative
Time Sequence (RTS) tables. The RTS tables are
sequences of commands that allow routine on-board
operations to be automated. The RTS table changes
included updates to account for malfunctioning
hardware, and updates to allow more efficient day to day
operations.

OTHER ON-ORBIT ISSUES
Operations
The Dellingr operational plan was to use a traditional
mission operation center (MOC) located at Goddard in
Greenbelt, MD and the Wallops UHF Ground Station
(GS) located in Wallops Island, VA. Dellingr, classified
as a “Do No Harm” mission, operated under a slightly
higher risk posture than a more traditional Goddard
mission. Therefore, the team did not perform as much
extensive MOC testing in regards to contingency
planning and how operations would be conducted if we
experienced significant software or hardware problems
on orbit, compared to missions with a lower risk posture.
The project plan had assumed a 1-month engineering
checkout period of the Dellingr satellite followed by
normal science operations. Normal operations were
envisioned and designed to support ground contacts
twice a day Monday through Friday, with most of the
downloading automated to reduce both staffing and cost.

The first major patch to the Dellingr flight software was
a replacement cFS application that implemented the Bdot algorithm in order to de-spin the spacecraft. The
existing Attitude Control System (ACS) cFS application
was designed with a built-in B-dot mode, but it was
determined the mode would not work without changes.
While the most logical path would have been to fix the
ACS B-dot code and upload a new version of the ACS
application, the ACS is the largest loadable application,
and would have taken many weeks of passes to fully
upload the new code. Rather than replace the ACS
application, the team decided to implement the B-dot
control algorithm in the GPS application, which
happened to be the smallest flight software to upload.
The team was able to code the B-dot algorithm, simulate
its ability to de-spin the spacecraft, and upload it in eight
parts. The new B-dot application was designed to stop
the current ACS and reaction wheel applications when
B-dot is active. The B-dot control application sends
commands to the cFS Executive Services to stop the
ACS and Reaction Wheel cFS applications. The B-dot
control can be commanded to idle mode in case we want
to run the normal ACS and Reaction Wheel apps.

Kepko

The initial checkout after deployment worked mostly as
planned. Sun-pointing worked and Dellingr was power
safe which allowed the team to spend time methodically
going through subsystem checkout. As described above,
once we began checkout we discovered a number of
different hardware and software problems. It became
apparent that the initial checkout was turning into a
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fulltime engineering exercise in finding solutions and
workarounds to the issues. The MOC team did not have
the engineering depth and knowledge specific to
Dellingr to address these challenges.

occurred in the middle of the Europe as shown in Figure
14 (bottom).

Due to the on-orbit challenges facing the missions, we
established an Alternate Mission Operation Center
(AMOC) for the engineering staff to operate, perform
mission diagnostics, and send corrective software
patches to restore as much functionality as possible. This
approach allowed the engineering team to operate
directly with the Dellingr system and not be encumbered
with the MOC operating processes. The engineering
team operating the AMOC was able to interact directly
with Dellingr, begin the process to diagnose the issues,
and work to find solutions to restoring science
operations. The MOC staff was used for just standard
data retrieval and archiving which they were setup to
perform for the normal mission operations. The recovery
effort was coordinated by the engineering staff and the
MOC team was called when the engineering team
needed their normal support role. This change allowed
us the streamline recovery efforts and reduce operating
costs by not needing both teams operating concurrently.

Figure 14. Approximate locations of the first (top)
and second (bottom) data deletion events.

The AMOC was setup in the Dellingr lab alongside the
flatsat hardware to support on-orbit diagnostics as
necessary (Figure 7). From the AMOC we were able to
interface with the Wallops ground system directly and
perform ground passes to collect diagnostic data,
monitor Dellingr health, and upload patches to fix or
work around anomalies. A tremendous amount of
engineering knowledge has been gained by the staff in
how to operate and optimize ground passes based on the
Cadet radio and the Wallops ground system. For
example, the team learned to look ahead to ground track
effects on data quality (primarily whether the pass was
over land or water), and their impacts to daily operating
plans, and schedule critical activities accordingly. In
general, this AMOC continues to be a tremendous
learning experience for the engineering team and will
have a major impact on future designs of GSFC’s
CubeSat missions.

At this point in time we do not have a good explanation
for the data deletion events. Direct command of the
satellite by a UHF ground station seems unlikely since
knowledge of Cadet radio operations is required since it
will reject any commands not formatted correctly. While
a single event upset is possible, particularly since the first
event occurred near the SAA, we do not have an
explanation for why an SEU would cause data deletion.
An SEU does not seem likely for the second deletion
event.
Data integrity
The Cadet radio appears to have an inherent bit-flip
problem. This behavior was observed during ground
testing in a laboratory environment but got worse once
on orbit. The Cadet radio has an error correction protocol
that can fix the first-bit flip and detect the second one in
each row of data. However, more than 2 bit-flips per row
occurs very frequently. We have found empirically that
data has to be downloaded several times to fill the gaps
and provide better data coverage. This affects the data
budget requiring more ground passes to download the
same data.

Data deletion
Dellingr’s radio memory bank was deleted twice during
the mission without an identifiable reason. In both cases
the satellite was neither in the range of the WFF ground
station nor in the same geographic location. The first
incident occurred on January 24, 2018, around 10:23 am
EST, losing approximately 650,000 packets of data. The
location was estimated to be over the south Atlantic
Ocean near South Africa and the South Atlantic
Anomaly (SAA), as shown in Figure 14 (top). The
second incident occurred on March 24, 2018 at 6:33 pm
EST, losing around 700,000 packets. This incident
Kepko

Uploading
Dellingr has the capability to add, delete or replace
applications and relative time sequences from the
ground. This feature is very useful and helped Dellingr
across the entire operations phase, particularly in
recovering from potentially mission-ending situations.
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Uploads are quite challenging, however, due to
limitations in the Cadet radio’s ability to upload.

necessary to validate the instrument. If we had held the
mission to specific Level 1 requirements, e.g., this would
not be considered success. But this flexibility in mission
implementation is required for resource constrained
CubeSats. In the end, only 3 systems cannot fail: power,
communication, and C&DH. And we suggest that it is
critically important for CubeSats to focus limited
resources on building an “architecture of resiliency” into
the design, with a narrowly focused reliability where
needed. This flexibility, when smartly incorporated into
the mission design, greatly increases the odds of mission
success, even if that path to success was not the one
initially envisioned.

Each radio uplink command size is 101 bytes, but more
than half are used for headers (PRN, Radio Header, and
CCSDS header). Such headers make the effective upload
for each command only 48 bytes. The radio is half
duplex, meaning that it cannot send and receive data at
the same time. Also, the radio is in receive mode for 0.1s
every second, while the rest of the time it is in idle mode.
Considering each message takes 0.084 seconds
(101bytes in 9600bps), we need to send each message at
least ten times to make sure we are hitting the listening
window of radio. In addition, each command includes a
delay of around 8 seconds to increase the success rate of
each command. In general, a command needs to be sent
several times to be successful. Sending a command 3
times was typically enough to have a high success rate
during uplink. In summary, the radio upload speed is
theoretically 9,600 bps, but in real world operations, we
were only able to upload 48 bytes (384 bits) every 24
seconds, with an effective average upload rate of 16 bps.

KEY LESSONS LEARNED
Dellingr on-orbit operations provided a wealth of
lessons-learned. We list these below, in no particular
order:
• A daily reset is a good failure detection and
correction solution if the concept of operations
allows. This minimizes the development of
algorithms and code to detect and react to certain
events in addition to overhead for the on-board
computer to monitor such telemetry points.
• Patching software is a common theme over the
course of the Dellingr mission operations. The
ability to replace almost any code driving
operations is a vital capability that can potentially
save missions.
• Uploading is challenging due to limited capability.
A conscious effort needs to happen during the
development of the software to minimize uploads.
Examples include table-based parameters and the
ability to change parts of a table instead of having
to upload a new table when changing one of such
parameters, and small application sizes
• Adding as much telemetry as possible and creating
filter tables is a good way to improve the ability to
troubleshoot. During nominal operations of
Dellingr, the amount of bus telemetry points
recorded and their cadence can be lowered to
minimize downloads. In case of anomalies or
during commissioning, the filter table can be set to
acquire selected telemetry and at a faster rate as
needed.
• Consider using redundant systems when having
reliability concerns if budget allows. Sometimes it
is less expensive to fly a redundant system than
attempting to improve the reliability or a single
component. Dellingr flew fine sun sensors from
two separate providers.
• With the increased risk posture of CubeSats, one
should plan in more contingency schedule time and

RESILIENCY VS. RELIABILITY.
Dellingr was envisioned to test the reliability of
CubeSats, CubeSat subsystems, and CubeSat
development efforts for NASA science missions, and
from that perspective, it was a success. We now have a
wealth of valuable lessons-learned that we are applying
to future CubeSat missions to increase mission
reliability, and these lessons span FSW to systems
engineering to MOC operations.
Although Dellingr was not a reliable mission, it was, and
continues to be, resilient. Just on the ACS side alone,
Dellingr lost GPS and the IMU, had a noisy FSS and a
bug in the FSW that caused uncontrolled spin-ups, and
an I2C issue that required turning off the reaction wheels.
Yet despite these failures and anomalies, we were still
able obtain to maintain a stable power positive
orientation through B-dot and obtain INMS ion data. At
the time of this writing, we are still working to
commission the neutral side of the INMS instrument, but
there is every indication that this will occur.
A typical spacecraft mission has sets of requirements that
it has to meet to be termed ‘successful’. Dellingr did not
carry such requirements, but rather had loosely defined
objectives. A primary objective was to obtain good
INMS ion and neutral spectra. Given a large expenditure
of resources, we could probably recover some level of
ram-pointing through some major software changes. But
the team instead focused on obtaining INMS data
through a slow roll of the spacecraft, such that it
periodically rotates the INMS aperture in the ram
direction. This would be sufficient to obtain the data
Kepko
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•

•
•
•

•

•

•

engineering staff for checkout and corrective
actions on-orbit than a traditional mission.
Plan to invest more time into data reduction,
analysis and trending to help identify subtle
hardware problems and take corrective action
before it turns into a larger problem.
Don’t design your FDC for only handling failed
components but also misbehaving hardware that
works intermittently.
Add hardware diagnostics to your software to help
isolate problems.
Add more flexibility to your software in its ability
to reconfigure between different ACS control
modes and science instrument usage to gain more
resiliency in your overall system to perform its
mission.
Having a full flatsat available is preferable, as is
extensive flight software testing with hardware in
the loop and a physics simulator. When selecting
hardware components, generally the fewer devices
that share a communication bus the better.
Sensor and actuator hardware should match the
flight computer's processing power; overshooting
specifications can cause as many problems as
under shooting.
Relatively low-cost lessons for flight software are
to ensure that low level hardware interfaces are
available to ground control software. This will
likely be advantageous for development and
testing. Dellingr used a separate diagnostic mode
to develop low level drivers and perform tests,
which accelerated development early on but is now
useless for diagnosing issues in flight. Using a
flight software framework that allows for software
to be updated in flight, such as NASA's open
source core Flight System, is essential for enabling
fixes after launch.

ability to upload software patches to correct pointing or
other issues in the control system software. However, we
had not expected that so many hardware issues would
affect Dellingr. Still, this on-orbit flexibility was the
lifesaving feature that allowed us to continue operations
and work around these discrete ACS component issues
as well. The bottom line is that this “architecture of
resiliency” is always a good thing to build into your
CubeSat mission, and the low costs of subsystem
components such as sun sensors makes it easy to add in
extra hardware.
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CONCLUSIONS
Despite multiple hardware anomalies and failures
Dellingr continues to operate at the time of this
writing. We are commissioning the INMS neutral mode,
which involves activation of an ionization filament. The
key to Dellingr’s continued operation is that the most
critical subsystems – communication, power and C&DH
– still function. With a limited budget and tight schedule,
we made the strategic decision to focus most of the
extensive ground testing on ensuring the reliability of
those three subsystems, and it has paid off for the
mission. The ACS system was the last one to be fully
integrated and tested; it was also the most difficult and
costly subsystem to perform end-to-end tests on to
uncover hardware or software issues. The team strategy
for reducing ACS risk and controlling test cost was to
focus on sun-pointing mode reliability. If Dellingr could
sun-point and stay power positive, then we could use our
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